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REVISING WASHINGTON'S CORPORATE PRACTICE OF
MEDICINE DOCTRINE
Lisa Rediger Hayward
Abstract: Current Washington law prohibits the corporate practice of medicine. The courts
have interpreted this doctrine to prohibit the employment of physicians by any entity, other
than a professional corporation or health maintenance organization, even if the corporation
only performs business functions. This Comment discusses the corporate practice of medicine
doctrine in Washington and its usefulness in the modem health care environment. It argues
that two of the doctrine's underlying justifications are effectuated more sensibly by current
regulatory provisions and that the doctrine should be retained only to prevent lay interference
with physician autonomy in medical decisions. This Comment recommends that the
Legislature amend the Medical Practice Act to clarify the scope of the doctrine and minimize
its harmful effects.
Suppose Dr. Smith, Dr. Jones, and Nurse Brown incorporate to form a
clinic to provide medical services to indigent persons in Seattle,
Washington. All three individuals are licensed in their respective
professions and have exceptional records for providing superior quality
care. The clinic operates successfully for some time; it earns its
reputation as an excellent source of care. However, a jealous competitor
brings suit against the clinic to drive it out of business. The ground for
suit: the clinic violates the corporate practice of medicine ban. The
outcome: Dr. Smith, Dr. Jones, and Nurse Brown lose their licenses to
practice and the clinic is permanently enjoined from "'practicing
medicine. "
The above scenario illustrates the corporate practice of medicine
doctrine which operates in virtually all states, including Washington, to
prohibit corporations from engaging in the practice of medicine. Courts
have interpreted the doctrine to bar most corporations' from employing
physicians because a corporation practices medicine through its
I. State legislatures have granted exceptions to the doctrine for non-profit corporations,
professional service corporations, and health maintenance organizations. See Cal. Corp. Code
§ 13404 (West 1991 & Supp. 1996) (authorizing the formation of professional service corporations
to practice medicine); Md. Code Ann., Health-Gen. § 19-704 (1990) (permitting health maintenance
organizations to employ physicians to practice medicine); N.D. Cent. Code § 26.1-49-02 (1995)
(declaring that nonprofit organizations do not violate the corporate practice of medicine ban); Wash.
Rev. Code § 18.100.050 (1994 & Supp. 1995) (authorizing licensed physicians to organize a
corporation to provide medical services, and authorizing physicians and other non-professional
individuals to incorporate in a health maintenance organization setting).
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employees.2 A corporation that practices medicine engages in the
unlicensed practice of medicine, subjecting it to both criminal and civil
liability.
Nevertheless, corporations have furnished medical services for many
years. Corporations contracted with mining and lumber companies to
provide medical services in Washington as early as 1900.3 In recent years
an increasing number of corporations have entered the health care field.4
The proliferation of health maintenance organizations (HMOs), preferred
provider organizations (PPOs), management service organizations
(MSOs), and independent practice associations (IPAs) exemplifies the
increased incorporation of medicine.5 Furthermore, integrated delivery
systems (IDSs)6 are the newest trend in health care delivery.' New and
varied organizational creatures will continue to emerge in the health care
marketplace as long as concerns over the cost and efficiency of providing
medical services predominate.
The corporate practice of medicine doctrine developed in the first half
of this century to protect consumers from receiving substandard care at
the hands of medical professionals hired by nonphysicians.' However,
the health care environment has changed considerably since the doctrine
was established.9 Regrettably, the corporate practice of medicine laws
have failed to keep pace with the rapidly changing health care
2. Most courts have not distinguished betwe..n the actual practice of medicine and furnishing
medical services through licensed professionals. See, e.g., People v. United Med. Serv., Inc., 200
N.E. 157 (III. 1936); Parker v. Board of Dental Examiners, 14 P.2d 67 (Cal. 1932).
3. Paul Starr, The Social Transformation ofAmerican Medicine 204-05 (1982.
4. Physician-hospital organizations (PHOs) have entered the market at a rapid pace. At the end of
1994, more than three-quarters of the estimated 500 PHOs were less than two years old, and about
half were less than one year old. See Physician Payment Review Commission, 1995 Annual Report
to Congress 245.
5. See generally Carl H. Hitchner et al., Integrated Delivery Systems: A Survey of Organizational
Models, 29 Wake Forest L. Rev. 273 (1994) (examining various integrated delivery systems and the
legal issues that may arise in each system).
6. An integrated delivery system is an organization that furnishes patients with all levels and types
of health care services from affiliated providers. Id. at 274.
7. Beth Melville, Hospitals Moving to Integrated Delivery Systems Facing Physician Resistance,
6 Managed Care Outlook (1993) available in Westlaw, MCAREOUTLK Database, 1993 WL
2822813 (citing recent survey indicating that 56.9% of hospitals, 76.8% of multiple hospital systems,
and 45.2% of medical group practices have an integrated delivery system or plan to have one in the
next year).
8. See generally Jeffrey F. Chase-Lubitz, The Corporate Practice of Meaicine Doctrine: An
Anachronism in the Modern Health Care Industry, 40 Vand. L. Rev. 445 (1987) (reviewing
development of corporate practice of medicine doctrine).
9. Id. at 478.
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environment. The trend is clearly moving toward more integrated
delivery systems, yet many of these organizations violate the
fundamental terms of the corporate practice of medicine doctrine.
Although the doctrine has existed for over fifty years, courts in
Washington have not considered it for some time.'0 New organizations
essentially are gambling that the doctrine will remain dormant. Recently,
however, the doctrine has experienced a resurgence in other states." It is
plausible that Washington could revive the doctrine as well. The
application of the corporate practice of medicine doctrine has the
potential to affect thousands of physician relationships in the state. The
growing movement toward managed care and integrated delivery
systems underscores the importance of resolving the status of the
doctrine in Washington. Furthermore, health care providers and their
attorneys need to be certain about what types of physician-health care
provider arrangements are lawful.
This Comment discusses the corporate practice of medicine doctrine
in Washington and argues that the Legislature should define its scope to
severely limit its application. Part I describes the evolution of the
doctrine nationwide and in Washington. It sets forth the justifications for
the doctrine's development and outlines the exceptions and the sanctions
for violation. Part II examines the current status of the doctrine and
discusses how the doctrine's scope has been extended over time. Part III
argues that the corporate practice of medicine laws have not kept pace
with the changing health care environment and do not reflect the current
legislative acquiescence to corporate-physician relationships. Finally,
part IV suggests that the Washington Legislature should adopt an
amended definition of the practice of medicine using a South Dakota
statute as a model.
10. The most recent decision involving the doctrine in Washington occurred in 1988. See Morelli
v. Ehsan, 10 Wash. 2d 555, 756 P.2d 129 (1988), infra part II.B.
11. In June 1995, an Illinois court found that a physician-clinic employment relationship violated
the Illinois Medical Practice Act of 1987, Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 111, par. 4400, which prohibits the
corporate practice of medicine. Berlin v. Sarah Bush Lincoln Health Ctr., No. 95-MR-7 (5th Cir. I1.
June 15, 1995), aff'd, 1996 WL 172738 (111. App. 4th Dist. Apr. 12, 1996) (No. 4-95-0569). This
ruling, if upheld by the Illinois Supreme Court, could invalidate employment relationships of
thousands of doctors throughout the state. See David Heckelman, Court Says Hospitals Cannot
Employ Non-Emergency Doctors, Chi. Daily L. Bull., April 15, 1996, at 1; Steven Morris, Illinois
Court Ruling Could Affect Doctors'Independence, Chi. Trib., Sept. 1, 1995, at 3N.
405
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I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE CORPORATE PRACTICE OF
MEDICINE DOCTRINE
A. Rationale Behind the Doctrine
The rule prohibiting the corporate practice of medicine originates in
part from state professional licensure requirements.' State medical
licensure acts forbid and provide sanctions against tie practice of
medicine by unlicensed persons.'3 Only a person call undergo the
training, examination, and character-screening that are prerequisites to
professional licensure.' 4 Thus, as impersonal entities, corporations are
unable to meet these statutory requirements and cannot practice
medicine."
The doctrine also evolved to protect the public from "quackery" and
possible abuses stemming from the commercial exploitation of the
practice of medicine. 6 The public policy justifications f3r the doctrine
include assumptions that: (1) corporate involvement in medical practice
creates a potential for divided physician loyalty between i:he corporation
and the patient;'7 (2) a lay person should not have control over medical
decision-making;' 8 (3) a corporation lacks the ability to establish and
maintain the trust requisite to the physician/patient relationship; 9 and
12. See Chase-Lubitz, supra note 8, at 464-65.
13. See Comment, Group Health Plans: Some Legal and Economic Aspects, 53 Yale L.J. 162, 167
(1943).
14. Alanson W. Willcox, Hospitals and the Corporate Practice of Medicine, 45 Cornell L.Q. 432,
438 (1960). See, e.g., Wash. Rev. Code § 18.71.011 (1994).
15. For many purposes, a corporation is treated as if it were a person. The edification of a
corporation to the status of a person is one of the most widely accepted legal fictions. The word
"person" as used in a statute will generally be construed to include corporations, as long as such an
interpretation fits within the general design and intent of the act. See Sanford A. Schane, The
Corporation Is a Person: The Language of a Legal Fiction, 61 Tul. L. Rev. 563 (1987). However,
courts have interpreted the term "person" in the context of medical licensing statutes to include only
human-beings. See e.g., Dr. Allison, Dentist, Inc. v. Allison, 196 N.E. 799, 800 (Il. 1935) ("To
practice a profession requires something more .... It can be done only by a duly qualified human
being .... The qualifications include personal characteristics .... No corporation can qualify.").
16. Michael A. Dowell, The Corporate Practice of Medicine Doctrine Must Go, HealthSpan, No.
10, Nov. 1994, at 7, available in Westlaw, HLHSP Database.
17. State Bd. of Optometry v. Gilmore, 3 So. 2d 708, 709 (Fla. 1941); Dr. Allison, 196 N.E. at 800
(stating that doctors who were hired by corTorations would owe their first allegiance to the
corporation and "cannot give the patient anything better than a secondary or divided loyalty").
18. People ex rel. State Bd. of Med. Examiners v. Pacific Health Corp., 82 P.2d 429, 430 (Cal.
1938), cert. denied, 306 U.S. 633 (1939).
19. Silver v. Lansburgh & Bros., Il1 F.2d 518, 520 (D.C. Cir. 1940); Dr. 4llison, 196 N.E. at
800.
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(4) a corporation may concem itself more with profit levels than with the
patients' quality of care or personal well-being.2"
B. Early Application of the Doctrine
1. Case Law Establishes the Doctrine
One of the earliest applications of the doctrine was in 1932, in Parker
v. Board of Dental Examiners."' Parker, a dentist, formed a corporation
for the purpose of owning and operating dental offices. The California
Supreme Court rejected Parker's argument that the actual practice of
dentistry should be distinguished from the purely business aspects of the
practice.22 Instead, the court upheld a finding that Parker had aided and
abetted an unlicensed person (the corporation)23 in the unlawful practice
of dentistry.24
People ex rel. State Board of Medical Examiners v. Pacific Health
Corp. 2 extended the doctrine to prohibit a corporation from contracting
with persons to pay for potential medical services in exchange for
payment of premiums. The corporation in that case paid for medical
services only if a person received treatment from a physician approved
by the corporation.26 The California Supreme Court held that this
arrangement violated the corporate practice doctrine.27 Pacific Health
argued unsuccessfully that the physicians were independent contractors,
not employees, because they were paid for actual services rendered rather
than compensated on a salary basis. The corporation also argued that the
physicians were not subject to corporate control. The court said that it
would not allow "technical distinctions" to circumvent the policy of the
20. California Ass'n of Dispensing Opticians v. Pearle Vision Ctr., Inc., 191 Cal. Rptr. 762, 773
(1983); United States v. American Med. Ass'n, 110 F.2d 703, 714 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 308 U.S.
599 (1939), and cert. denied, 310 U.S. 644 (1940).
21. 14 P.2d 67 (Cal. 1932).
22. Id. at 71-72.
23. In this context, the court interpreted the word "person" to include a corporate entity. See
generally Schane, supra note 15 (examining the philosophical background, constitutional
controversies, and the linguistic basis of treating the corporation as a person).
24. Parker, 14 P.2d at 73.
25. 82 P.2d 429 (Cal. 1938), cert. denied, 306 U.S. 633 (1939).
26. Id. at 429. The contractual arrangement proposed in Board. of Med. Examiners resembles a
preferred provider organization (PPO). See supra note 4 (discussing the operation of PPOs
throughout the United States).
27. Id. at 430.
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law and added that "the evils of divided loyalty" would be present
whether physician benefits were from salary or fees.2"
These two decisions and others29 firmly established. the corporate
practice of medicine doctrine, and it became the nationwide majority
rule. Eventually, all states but Nebraska adopted the doctrine.31 Courts
and state officials rigorously enforced the corporate ban throughout the
first half of this century.3'
2. Washington Adopts the Doctrine
The Washington Supreme Court first recognized the corporate
practice of medicine doctrine in 1943 in State ex rel. Standard Optical
Co. v. Superior Court.32 The case involved a proceeding in the nature of
quo warranto3 3 against the defendant corporation, charging it with
unlawfully practicing optometry.34 Standard Optical operated a store
which was in the sole charge of a licensed optometrist.35 The corporation
employed the optometrist and paid him a salary plus a commission based
upon the gross receipts.36 Standard Optical purported to exert no control
over the optometrist's professional judgment.37 The supreme court held
that optometry was a profession that only persons, not corporations,
could practice. Accordingly, the court found the defendant corporation
guilty of practicing optometry within the state. 3' The court declared that
whether the "optometrist in his practice exercised his professional
judgment conscientiously in each individual case, [had] no bearing upon
28. Id.
29. The Illinois Supreme Court in People v. United Medical Serv., Inc., for example, interpreted
the language of the state's medical practice act to prevent a corporation from providing medical
services through its clinic and rejected the argument that owning a corporation ihat employs licensed
physicians and collects patient fees does not constitute practicing medicine. 200 N.E. 157 (111. 936).
30. See John Wiorek, The Corporate Practice of Medicine Doctrine: An Outmoded Theory in
Need of Modification, 8 J. Legal Med. 465,482 (1987).
31. Id. at 475-84.
32. 17 Wash. 2d 323, 135 P.2d 839 (1943).
33. A writ used in the law of corporations to test whether a corporation is validly organized or
whether it has the power to engage in the business in which it is involved. Black's Law Dictionary
868 (6th. ed. 1991).
34. Standard Optical, 17 Wash. 2d at 324, 135 P.2d at 840.
35. Id. at 326, 135 P.2d at 840.
36. ld.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 331, 135 P.2d at 842-43.
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the questions here presented."39 The court also characterized the
employment contract as a "[device] to avoid the provisions of our
statutes.4°
In arriving at its holding in Standard Optical, the court relied on the
nationwide majority rule against the corporate practice of medicine.4'
The court also articulated the evils it wished to avoid. Specifically, it
noted that corporations might practice medicine or dentistry by
employing licensed agents which would destroy professional standards,
and that professions would be commercialized to the public detriment.42
The court explained that professional ethics are based upon personal
responsibility to a patient, and therefore, a professional cannot act
properly if he is "an agent of a corporation or business partnership whose
interests.., are commercial in character."'43
The Washington Supreme Court next applied the doctrine in State v.
Boren.' The defendants, Boren and Shepherd, formed a partnership to
own, maintain, and operate dental offices. Neither Boren nor Shepherd
had ever been licensed to practice dentistry in Washington. The
partnership entered into a conditional sales contract with Harlow, a
licensed dentist, to sell its Seattle office.45 Boren managed the office as a
part of the deal, and his duties included purchasing supplies, handling the
accounts and payments, and advertising the practice.46 The court
reiterated the holding from Standard Optical that an unlicensed person or
entity may not engage in the practice of medicine, surgery, or dentistry
through licensed employees.47 To reach the conclusion that the partners
were unlawfully practicing dentistry, the court relied on a statute that
defined the practice of dentistry to include a person "'who owns,
maintains or operates an office for the practice of dentistry."' 4
39. Id. at 334, 135 P.2d at 844.
40. Id. at331, 135 P.2dat 842.
41. The majority rule is that "a corporation cannot engage in the practice of medicine, and that
neither a corporation nor any other unlicensed person or entity may engage, through licensed
employees, in the practice of medicine or surgery." Id. at 329, 135 P.2d at 841.
42. Id. at 331-32, 135 P.2d at 842 (citing Ezell v. Ritholz, 198 S.E. 419, 424 (S.C. 1938)).
43. Id. (quoting Ezell, 198 S.E. at 424).
44. 36 Wash. 2d 522,219 P.2d 566, appeal dismissed per curiam, 340 U.S. 881 (1950).
45. Id. at 523, 219 P.2d at 567.
46. Id. at 524, 219 P.2d at 567.
47. Id. at 531,219 P.2d at 572.
48. Id. at 525-26, 219 P.2d at 568 (quoting Rem. Rev. Stat. § 10031(6)).
409
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C. Exceptions and Limitations to the Doctrine
State court decisions and legislative acts have carved out exceptions to
the general rule against the corporate practice of medicine. Thus, the
application and scope of the doctrine varies among the states.
1. Nonprofit Organizations
Some states distinguish between not-for-profit and for-profit
corporations and refuse to apply the doctrine to nonprofit organizations." 9
The rationale that courts generally give for excluding nonprofit
organizations is that the policy concerns underlying the doctrine largely
are vitiated when the profit motive is removed. 0 For example, courts
commonly announce that concerns of commercial exploitation, divided
physician loyalty, and lay control of physicians justify the corporate
prohibition." But because these principal evils spring frcm the conflict
between the professional and the profit motive of the corporation, they
do not apply to nonprofit organizations. 2
The Washington courts and Legislature have never accepted this
distinction between for-profit and nonprofit organizations. Every
Washington case that applied the doctrine, however, invelved for-profit
organizations. 3 Thus, it is unclear whether Washington courts would
recognize the nonprofit exception, if presented with an appropriate case.
2. Professional Corporations
All states have limited the scope of the corporate practice of medicine
doctrine by adopting statutes which authorize licensed professionals to
49. E.g., N.D. Cent. Code § 26.1-49-02 (1995) (stating that a "nonprofit healtl service corporation
... does not violate limitations on the corporate practice of medicine") (emphasis added); see also
People ex rel. State Bd. of Med. Examiners v. Pacific Health Corp., 82 P.2d 429, 430-31 (Cal. 1938)
(contrasting nonprofit and profit organizations and noting that nonprofits are rever "molested" by
the public authorities), cert. denied, 306 U.S. 633 (1939).
50. Board of Medical Examiners, 82 P.2d at 431 (stating that "the objections of policy do not
apply to nonprofit institutions"). See generally 6770 Op. Mich. Att'y Gen. (1993) (reviewing legal
authority from many states regarding the propriety of nonprofit hospitals employing physicians and
concluding that the corporate practice prohibition does not apply to nonprofit corporations).
51. See supra text accompanying notes 17-20.
52. See Board of Medical Examiners, 82 P.2d at 431; see also Henry B. Hensmann, Reforming
Nonprofit Corporation Law, 129 U. Pa. L. Rev. 497, 539 (1981).
53. Morelli v. Ehsan, 110 Wash. 2d 555, 756 P.2d 129 (1988); State v. Boren, 36 Wash. 2d 522,
219 P.2d 566, appeal dismissed per curiam, 340 U.S. 881 (1950); State ex rel. Standard Optical Co.
v. Superior Court, 17 Wash. 2d 323, 135 P.2d 839 (1943).
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form professional corporations to engage in the practice of medicine. 4
However, these statutes usually require that all shareholders and officers
of the corporation be licensed professionals.5
In Washington, the Legislature enacted the Professional Service
Corporations Act in 1969.56 The Act authorizes licensed physicians to
organize a corporation to provide medical services. The Act creates a
very narrow exception to the corporate practice of medicine prohibition
because only individuals who hold the same professional license either
can join in the formation of a given professional service corporation or
become shareholders therein at any time after its formation. 8
3. Health Maintenance Organizations
State legislatures have also provided an exception to the doctrine for
health maintenance organizations that employ physicians to practice
medicine. HMO development became a federal priority in the early
1970s as a mechanism to curb rising health care costs.59 However, state
laws prohibiting the corporate practice of medicine posed a significant
obstacle to HMO growth. In response to this problem, numerous states
adopted legislation that expressly exempted application of the corporate
practice doctrine to provider relationships with HMOs6 0
The Washington Legislature amended the Professional Service
Corporations Act in 1983 to produce an HMO exception. The
54. See Lee Joseph Dunn, Jr., Professional Corporations: Their Development and Present Status
with Respect to the Practice of Medicine, 24 U. Fla. L. Rev. 625, 635 (1972) (reporting that all states
but Wyoming had legislation authorizing professional corporations). Wyoming has since passed
such legislation. Wyo. Stat. § 17-3-101 (1995).
55. See, e.g., Cal. Corp. Code §§ 13401.5-13406 (West 1991 & Supp. 1996); N.Y. Limited
Liability Co. Law § 1203 (McKinney 1996); Or. Rev. Stat. § 58.108 (1995) (requiring that a majority
of shareholders and officers be licensed professionals); Wash. Rev. Code § 18.100.050 (1994 &
Supp. 1995).
56. Wash. Rev. Code § 18.100.050.
57. The Act defines a professional corporation as "a corporation which is organized.., for the
purpose of rendering professional service." Wash Rev. Code § 18.100.030(2) (1994). The Act
further provides that "[n]o corporation organized under this chapter may render professional services
except through individuals who are duly licensed or otherwise legally authorized to render such
professional services within this state." Wash. Rev. Code § 18.100.060 (1994).
58. Wash. Rev. Code § 18.100.050. This provision, thus, would not exempt the hypothetical
Smith-Jones-Brown clinic.
59. See generally Arnold J. Rosoff, Phase Two of the Federal HMO Development Program: New
Directions After a Shaky Start, 1 Am. J.L. & Med. 209 (1975) (tracing the development and passage
of the Health Maintenance Act of 1973).
60. See, e.g., Md. Code Ann., Health-Gen. § 19-704 (1990); Minn. Stat. § 62R.03 (Supp. 1995);
N.D. Cent. Code § 26.1-49-02 (1995).
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amendment provides that "licensed health care professionals, providing
services to enrolled participants either directly or through arrangements
with a health maintenance organization... may own stock in and render
their individual professional services through one professional service
corporation."'" Thus, the so-called HMO exception authorizes physicians
and other non-professional individuals to incorporate in an HMO setting.
Although the legislative history of this amendment reveal, little as to the
impetus for the amendment, the nationwide trend and pressure from the
increasing employment of physicians by HMOs such as Group Health
Cooperative of Puget Sound most likely contributed to its adoption. 2
D. Penalties for Violating the Corporate Practice of Medicine
Doctrine
Few states expressly prohibit the corporate practice of medicine.63 As
a result, penalties generally are imposed for the unlicenSed practice of
medicine.64 Most states consider it a criminal offense for any person or
entity to practice or attempt to practice medicine without a valid
license."
Section 18.71.011 of the Revised Code of Washington defines the
practice of medicine,66 and section 18.71.021 requires that an individual
possess a valid license in order to practice medicine.67 Thus, a
61. Wash. Rev. Code § 18.100.050.
62. See Washington State Hosp. Ass'n, Modem Physician/Hospital Relationhips, December 16,
1993 (unpublished position paper, on file with tha Washington Law Review).
63. See, e.g., Colo. Rev. Stat. § 12-36-134(7) (Supp. 1995); Ga. Code Ann. § 33-20-18(d) (Michie
1992); S.D. Codified Laws Ann. § 36-4-8.1 (Supp. 1995); Tex. Ins. Code Ann. art. 20.12 (West
Supp. 1996); W. Va. Code § 30-3-15(d) (1993).
64. See Dowell, supra note 16.
65. See. e.g., Idaho Code § 54-1804 (1994); N.M. Stat. Ann § 61-6-20 (Michie 1993); 63 Pa.
Cons. Stat. § 422.39 (1996).
66. The statute provides:
A person is practicing medicine if he...
(1) [o]ffers or undertakes to diagnose, cure, advise or prescribe for any human disease, ailment,
injury . .. or other condition, physical or mental, real or imaginary, by any means or
instrumentality;
(2) [a]dministers or prescribes drugs ... to be used by any other person;
(3) [s]evers or penetrates the tissues of human beings;
(4) [u]ses on cards, books, papers ... giving information to the public ... the designation
"doctor of medicine", "physician", "surgeon", "m.d." or any combination therc of.
Wash. Rev. Code § 18.71.011 (1994).
67. Wash. Rev. Code § 18.71.021 (Supp. 1995).
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corporation-excluding a professional service corporation or HMO-
that practices medicine engages in the unlicensed practice of medicine
because only individuals are eligible for licenses."
The Secretary of Health is responsible for investigating complaints
concerning the unlicensed practice of medicine in Washington and has
the authority to issue a temporary or permanent cease and desist order,
which may include a civil fine.69 In addition, the Attorney General, a
county prosecuting attorney, or any person may maintain an action in the
name of the state to enjoin the unlicensed practice of medicine.7" The
injunctive remedy is in addition to any criminal liability.7 ' The
unlicensed practice of medicine constitutes a gross misdemeanor for a
single violation, and each subsequent violation is a class C felony.72
II. CURRENT STATUS OF THE CORPORATE PRACTICE OF
MEDICINE DOCTRINE
The influence and effects of the corporate practice of medicine
doctrine have waned considerably in modem times.73 In recent years, all
but a handful of states have generally ignored the doctrine.74 At last
count, five states were enforcing the doctrine, twenty-six states
(including Washington) were either neglecting the doctrine or were
ambiguous about its application, and nineteen states were ignoring or had
68. Wash. Rev. Code § 18.71.021 ("No person may practice medicine ... without first having a
valid license to do so.") (emphasis added). Courts have consistently interpreted the word "person" in
medical licensure statutes to include only human-beings and not corporations. See supra note 15.
69. Wash. Rev. Code § 18.130.190(2), (4) (Supp. 1995).
70. Wash. Rev. Code § 18.130.190(6) (Supp. 1995). Previous Washington case law established a
physician's right to seek injunctive relief against unlicensed persons attempting to practice medicine
without a license. See Day v. Inland Empire Optical, Inc., 76 Wash. 2d 407, 456 P.2d 1011 (1969).
Thus, this statute apparently broadens the standing to object to the unlicensed practice of medicine to
include any person.
71. Wash. Rev. Code § 18.130.190(6).
72. Wash. Rev. Code § 18.130.190(7) (Supp. 1995).
73. See Dowell, supra note 16.
74. See Wiorek, supra note 30, at 471-84 (reviewing the status of the corporate practice of
medicine doctrine in each state in 1987).
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repudiated the doctrine.75 Moreover, several states that recently applied
the doctrine utilized it beyond its scope.76
A. The Illegality Defense Extends the Scope of the Doctrine
Although the doctrine originally was established to shield patients
from poor-quality care, increasingly it has been used as a sword to sever
physician relationships. Corporate practice of medicine allegations are
part of the growing illegality defense.77 The illegality defense is an
extension of the general rule of law that courts will not enforce illegal
contracts." Thus, parties may seek to escape their obligations under
employment or other agreements for professional services with
corporations by asserting an illegality defense based on the corporate
practice of medicine prohibition.
A recent Illinois case79 illustrates how this defense can work. In 1992,
Dr. Richard Berlin, Jr., signed a five-year exclusive employment
agreement with Sarah Bush Lincoln Health Center. Berlin resigned in
1994 and began working for a neighboring clinic, in apparent violation
of a non-competition clause.80 The hospital sued. Berlin responded that
the contract violated the Illinois Medical Practice Act8' which prohibits
the corporate practice of medicine. The trial court agreed, granted
Berlin's motion for summary judgment, and held that the contract was
not enforceable. 2 The appellate court affirmed." Berlin demonstrates
how the corporate practice of medicine doctrine has moved beyond the
scope of its original purpose.
75. Id. Cf. Terese Hudson, Hospitals Work Through the Corporate Practice Maze, Hosp. &
Health Networks, Oct. 5, 1994, at 60, available in Westlaw, HHNTWK database, 1994 WL
2887124, at *3 (stating that 13 states actively enforce the corporate practice ban, 13 states allow
physician employment by hospitals, and the rest are somewhere in the middle).
76. Berlin v. Sarah Bush Lincoln Health Ctr., No. 95-MR-7 (5th Cir. I11. June 15, 1995), affd,
1996 WL 172738 (111. App. 4th Dist. Apr. 12, 1996) (No. 4-95-0569); Morelli v. Ehsan, 110 Wash.
2d 555, 756 P.2d 129 (1988).
77. See Michael W. Peregrine et al., Hospital/Physician Contracting and the Illegality Defense,
27 J. Health & Hosp. L. 129 (1994).
78. "It is a general rule that where the contract grows immediately out of, and is connected with,
an illegal act, a court ofjustice will not lend its aid to enforce it." Hederman v. George, 35 Wash. 2d
357, 361,212 P.2d 841, 843 (1949).
79. Berlin, No. 95-MR-7 (5th Cir. I11.).
80. Id., slip op. at 6-7.
81. Illinois Medical Practice Act of 1987, 111. Rev. Stat. ch. I 11, 4400 (1987).
82. Berlin, No. 95-MR-7, slip op. at 9-10.
83. Berlin, 1996 WL 172738 at *1 (11. App. 4th Dist. Apr. 12, 1996) (No. 4-95-0569).
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B. Recent Application of the Doctrine in Washington
The Washington Supreme Court most recently applied the corporate
practice of medicine doctrine in 1988. In Morelli v. Ehsan,84 the court
declared a limited partnership, where a physician and a nonphysician
operated a medical clinic, to be illegal." Morelli is the only Washington
case since 1950 to discuss the corporate practice prohibition.
In 1980, Tito Morelli and Dr. Mike Ehsan entered a limited
partnership agreement to establish and operate a medical clinic.86 The
clinic employed licensed physicians as the medical staff, who were paid
on an hourly basis." The contract entitled Morelli and Ehsan to share
equally in profits and losses, each receiving a salary for services
rendered.88 The agreement granted each equal rights to manage the
business and defined Morelli as "Director of Operations" and Ehsan as
the "Medical Director."8 9 In 1985, Morelli petitioned the court for a
dissolution of the partnership and an accounting. Ehsan moved to dismiss
Morelli's complaint, arguing that the partnership agreement was illegal
and void.90 Morelli claimed that he was not practicing medicine because
his responsibilities were strictly limited to business aspects of the clinic
while Ehsan's authority was limited to its medical affairs. 9'
The court held the partnership illegal as a matter of law because it
constituted the unlicensed practice of medicine.92 The court relied on
section 18.71.011 (1) of the Revised Code of Washington, which defines
the practice of medicine.93 The court also interpreted the Professional
Service Corporations Act to prohibit lay participation in a professional
partnership as well as in a corporation.94
Morelli illustrates that the corporate practice of medicine doctrine in
Washington exceeds its original scope. Like the Berlin case, Morelli
involves an illegality defense. Ehsan used the doctrine to defend against
84. 110 Wash. 2d 555, 756 P.2d 129 (1988).
85. Id. at 561,756 P.2d at 132.
86. Id. at 556, 756 P.2d at 129.
87. Id. at 557, 756 P.2d at 130.
88. Id. at 556, 756 P.2d at 130.
89. Id. at 556-57, 756 P.2d at 130.
90. Id. at 557, 756 P.2d at 130.
91. Id. at 558, 756 P.2d at 130.
92. Id. at 561,756 P.2d at 132.
93. Id. at 558, 756 P.2d at 13 1. See supra note 66 for the relevant language of the statute.
94. Morelli, 110 Wash. 2d at 561, 756 P.2d at 132.
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Morelli's accounting action.95 The state did not invoke the doctrine to
protect patients from shoddy care, rather an individual successfully used
the doctrine to avoid a legal obligation.
The precise operation of the doctrine is doubtful because no reported
case or administrative decision in Washington discusses employment of a
physician by a health care corporation. Standard OpticaM
6 and Boren97
involved optometry and dentistry, respectively. Further, Morelli did not
involve a health care corporation, but rather a business partnership.98
Thus, the existing case law leaves unanswered the current questions
about the employment of physicians. However, a likely extrapolation
from existing case law is that the doctrine prohibits the employment of
physicians by any entity other than a professional corporation or HMO,
even if the corporation only performs business functions.9 9
III. WASHINGTON'S CORPORATE PRACTICE OF MEDICINE
LAWS ARE INAPPOSITE TO THE EVOLVING HEALTH
CARE ENVIRONMENT
Today's health care industry differs from the one in which the
corporate practice of medicine prohibition originated. The manner in
which health care services are organized, delivered, and financed has
significantly changed,'"u but the corporate practice of medicine laws have
not kept pace with these changes.
The health care environment of the early 1900s consisted of solo
general practitioners. Physicians carried most of their equipment in black
bags, and house calls were the norm.' Hospitals were primarily
religious and charitable in nature."2 Health insurance was not prevalent;
hence, individuals made the bulk of all personal health care
95. Id. at 557, 756 P.2d at 130.
96. State ex rel. Standard Optical Co. v. Superior Court, 17 Wash. 2d 323, 135 P.2d 839 (1943).
97. State v. Boren, 36 Wash. 2d 522, 219 P.2d 566, appeal dismissed per curiam, 340 U.S. 881
(1950).
98. 110 Wash. 2d at 556,756 P.2d at 129.
99. See supra part I.B.
100. See Chase-Lubitz, supra note 8, at 478-79.
101. See generally Starr, supra note 3, at 145-232 (discussing metamorphosis over time of
hospital as institution).
102. See Anthony R. Kovner, Health Care Delivery in the United States 142 (4,h ed. 1990).
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expenditures." 3 HMOs and other types of managed care organizations
were nonexistent."°
Gradually, physicians began to specialize, medical technology
proliferated, hospitals provided increasingly complex care, and health
insurance became common. 5 In addition, health care costs rose
dramatically.0 6 In response to escalating costs, private payers and
employers increased efforts to "manage" the utilization of health care.
Corporate entities, such as HMOs or PPOs, developed delivery systems
to provide health services in a more cost-efficient manner.0 7 Thus,
beginning in the late 1970s, the use of managed health care grew at a
phenomenal rate.0 8 The ability to reduce total health care expenditures
enhanced the spectacular growth in managed care enrollment.'0 9
A. A Conflict Between Modern Innovations and an Old Doctrine
Price sensitivity, growing competition, and spiraling costs characterize
the modem health care environment. Recent predictions indicate that
103. Private health expenditures accounted for 86.4% of total health care expenditures in 1929.
Id. at 242.
104. Id. at 251-58.
105. See generally Starr, supra note 3, at 145-232.
106. In 1935, Americans spent $2.9 billion on total health expenditures, which comprised 4% of
the gross national product (GNP). See Kovner, supra note 102, at 242. Total health expenditures
include health services and supplies, drugs and other medical nondurables, program administration,
and research and construction. By 1960, total health expenditures exceeded $27 billion (5.3% GNP),
and in 1993, Americans spent $884 billion (13.9% GNP) on total health expenditures, a 7.8%
increase over 1992. See Katharine R. Levit et al., National Health Spending Trends, 1960-1993,
Health Aff., Winter 1994, at 14-15. National spending for health care grew an average of 12.7% per
year from 1970 to 1987. In addition, the rate of increase in health care costs consistently has far
exceeded the rate of inflation in the general economy. See Kovner, supra note 102, at 240-69.
107. For example, HMO patients tend to utilize fewer hospital services and fewer costly and
elective procedures. See Robert H. Miller & Harold S. Luft, Managed Care Plan Performance Since
1980: A Literature Analysis, 271 JAMA 1512 (1994).
108. Enrollment in HMOs grew rapidly during the 1980s, growing 300% in just eight years to
include 29.3 million people by 1987. Further, of those receiving health insurance through the
workplace, over 70% were enrolled in some type of managed-care plan. See Kovner, supra note 102,
at 281. Managed care enrollment accounted for 58% of the private health insurance market in 1993.
See Levit et al., supra note 106, at 23. See generally Rodney C. Armstead et al., Toward a 2 1st
Century Quality-Measurement System for Managed-Care Organizations, Health Care Fin. Rev.,
Summer 1995, at 25-26. Managed-care contracts among Medicare beneficiaries have increased
steadily. In 1987, about 1.7 million beneficiaries were enrolled in managed-care plans. By July 1995,
over 3.5 million Medicare beneficiaries had enrolled in managed-care plans (an 18% increase over
1994). Id.
109. Data gathered from the Rand Health Insurance Experiment justify the conclusion that HMO
care results in lower utilization and, thus, lower costs. See Edward H. Wagner & Turner Bledsoe,
The Rand Health Insurance Experiment and HMOs, Med. Care, March 1990, at 191.
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managed care will continue to grow dramatically."' Another physician
forecaster anticipates that the health care industry eventually will be
composed primarily of corporate physicians working as employees of
managed care plans, medical groups, and hospitals."'
In Washington, recent state health reform measures endorsed managed
care. The Legislature created the Washington Health Care Cost Control
and Access Commission in 1990 to recommend changes to improve
access to essential health services and stabilize the overall costs of health
care in Washington."' In 1992, the Commission recommended that a
substantial majority of the state's population should receive health care
services through managed health care systems and integrated delivery
systems.' In response, the Legislature enacted the Health Services Act
of 1993 to achieve these goals. Although the Legislature repealed
sections of the act in 1995,"' the emphasis on managed care and
integrated delivery remains clear. Moreover, market refonms indicate that
Washington is experiencing increased managed care market
penetration."5
Health policy analysts, legislators, and presidential candidates have
hailed managed care as an indispensable part of health care reform
because of its proven ability to reduce costs." 6 Some may dispute the
propriety of shifting toward managed care,' but it is the reality of our
110. Terese Hudson, Scoping Out 1995: How Experts See the Health Care Year Unfolding (1995
Economic Forecast), Hosp. & Health Networks, Jan. 5, 1995, at 21, available in Westlaw,
HHNTWK Database, 1995 WL 8429216 (interviewing a panel of six economic experts regarding
changes in the health care market).
11. Charles Culhane, Forecasters Agree on One Thing: Changes Are Coming, Am. Med. News,
April 1994, at 8, available in Westlaw, AMEDNEWS Database, 1994 WL 12762986. A California
physician made this prediction at a forum on the health care system of tomorrow sponsored by
Faulkner & Gray's Healthcare Information Center. Id.
112. Wash. Rev. Code § 43.72.005 (1994) (repealed 1995).
113. Engrossed Second Substitute Senate Bill No. 5304 (1992), Wash. Sen. J. at 236 (1992). See
generally Robert A. Crittenden, Managed Competition and Premium Caps in Washington State,
Health Aff., Summer 1993, at 82 (discussing history, elements, and weaknesses of Health Services
Act).
114. See Wash. Rev. Code § 48.01.200, repealed by 1995 Wash. Laws ch. 265, § 27; 1995 Wash.
Laws ch. 267 § 11.
115. See generally Paul J. Lim, Group Health to Bolster Virginia Mason Link, Seattle Times, Dec.
19, 1995, at El; Paul J. Lim, State-Subsidized Plan Could Be Alternative, Seattle Times, Dec. 17,
1995, at F1; Paul J. Lim, Health-Care Sector Gets New Player, Seattle Times, July 19, 1995, at D4;
Paul J. Lim, More Health-Care Mergers, Alliances Ahead, Seattle Times, Dec. 21, 1994, at Di.
116. See Drew E. Altman, The Revolution in Health Care Is in Delivery, L.A. Times, Dec. 5,
1994, at B7; Irene Wielawski, Managed Care Eludes Only Congress, L.A. Time;, Sept. 30, 1994, at
B7.
117. See generally Kenneth I. Shine, Quality of Health and Health Care, 273 JAMA 244 (1995).
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modem system. However, the corporate practice of medicine doctrine
stands directly in the path of managed care growth. For example, fifty-
nine percent of hospitals responding to a recent survey reported that
physicians are requesting employment." 8 New England had the highest
employment rate (81 percent of hospitals responding to the survey
actually employed physicians), while the Pacific region had the lowest
(only 24 percent of hospitals responding to the survey actually employed
physicians)." 9 The survey indicated that state laws that prohibited
hospitals from hiring physicians were directly responsible for the
differences among the regions. 2 '
B. Market Changes and Policy Concerns Diminish the Underlying
Justifications for the Doctrine
Although an organization might be able to bypass the corporate
prohibition (for example, by using the HMO exception),' the validity of
the doctrine must be re-evaluated in light of changes in the health care
market and current policy concerns. Additionally, the doctrine merits
review because current state and federal laws implicitly recognize
corporate involvement in the practice of medicine through physician
employment.
1. Professional Standards
Modem regulatory provisions protect professional standards more
sensibly than the corporate practice prohibition. Licensing statutes,
quality management mechanisms, and accreditation help to preserve
medical professional standards and promote quality of care without
hindering managed care development. These mechanisms supplant the
need for the corporate practice of medicine doctrine.
State ex rel. Standard Optical Co. v. Superior Court first articulated
the concern that corporate involvement in medicine would destroy
professional standards."z However, Standard Optical and the corporate
practice prohibition evolved during a time when professional standards
were not subject to the current standards of regulation. First,
118. Deloitte & Touche, U.S. Hospitals and the Future of Health Care 19 (5th ed. 1994).
119. Id. at20.
120. Id.
121. See supra notes 59-61 and accompanying text.
122. 17 Wash. 2d 323, 331, 135 P.2d 839, 843 (1943). See supra notes 42-43 and accompanying
text.
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Washington's licensing statutes currently require an inquiry into
physician credentials. For example, hospitals have an affirmative duty to
request information about any pending professional medical misconduct
proceedings prior to hiring or granting clinical privileges.'23 In addition,
Washington's HMO licensing law requires that an HMO conduct peer
review, which includes examining physician credentials and monitoring
physician competence in delivering health care services.' 24 Thus, the
present licensing laws adequately protect against the corporate erosion of
professional standards.
Second, quality management 125 that is compulsory under several
sources of legal authority'26 helps to safeguard physician professional
standards. Quality management includes functions such as peer review,
utilization review, and credentials review.27 Washington law requires
that hospitals, nursing homes, and managed care entities engage in
quality management. 128  Thus, quality management programs have
diminished the need for the corporate practice of medicine doctrine to
protect quality and professional standards.
Finally, the establishment of accrediting bodies, such as the Joint
Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations (JCAHO)
29
123. Wash. Rev. Code § 70.41.230(1) (1994).
124. Wash. Rev. Code § 48.46.040(5)(a) (1994).
125. See Arthur F. Southwick & Debora A. Slee, Peer Review ofProfessioral Practice, in The
Law of Hospital and Health Care Administration 623 n.1 (2d ed. 1988) (asserting that although
traditionally referred to as quality assurance (QA), because no committee can "assure" or guarantee
quality of person or institutional health services, term quality management more accurately describes
this function).
126. The sources of legal mandate includ,. the Standards of the Joirt Commission on
Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations (which are admissible in evidence in a negligence or
malpractice lawsuit); state statutory law regulating the licensure of hospitals, HMOs, and physicians;
and federal statutory provisions creating bodies to review the quality and appropriateness of
Medicare services. Id. at 623-25. In addition, the federal Health Maintenance Organization Act of
1973 required a QA program. See Conrad Sobczak et al., Quality Measurement and Management in
an HMO Setting, 18 Top. Health Care Fin. 67 (1991).
127. See Southwick & Slee, supra note 125, at 623-24.
128. Wash. Rev. Code § 70.41.200 (1994) ("Every hospital shall maintain a coordinated quality
improvement program for the improvement of the quality of health care services rendered to patients
and the identification and prevention of medical malpractice."); Wash. Rev. Code § 18.51.007
(1994) (stating that nursing homes shall establish "an inspection and reporting system to insure that
[they] are in compliance with . . . regulations pertaining to patient care"); Wash. Rev. Code
§ 48.46.030(l)(m) (1994) (requiring that HMOs provide a "description of tie procedures and
programs to be implemented to assure that the health care services delivered . . . will be of
professional quality").
129. The JCAHO currently accredits hospitals; however, in January 1994 JCAHO established a
set of standards for accrediting networks in such areas as patients' rights and responsibilities,
continuum of care, information management, and performance improvement. See Karen Sandrick, Is
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and the National Committee for Quality Assurance (NCQA) 3 ° has
weakened the doctrine's need law to protect professional standards. The
JCAHO and NCQA scrutinize organizations to ensure that patients
receive quality care.' Accreditation protects quality and professional
standards more effectively than the corporate practice prohibition
because it provides for periodic review of an organization rather than a
one-time inquiry into quality of care during a lawsuit. The accreditation
mechanism protects professional standards even if an organization elects
to decline accreditation. For example, if a hospital is not accredited, the
JCAHO's standards nevertheless will help define the standard of care in
a negligence action.'32 In addition, pressure from employers, the largest
provider of health insurance, has resulted in an increase in voluntary
accreditation.' 33 These accrediting bodies are another device for
promoting quality in health care that did not exist when the corporate
practice prohibition developed and hence weaken the need for the
doctrine.
2. Absence of Commercial Exploitation and Divided Loyalties
Washington case law also has articulated fears that corporate
involvement in medicine would result in commercial exploitation and
divide physician loyalties between the corporation and the patient.3' The
courts were concerned that the physician would place the corporation's
financial interests above patient welfare, resulting in lower quality of
care.'35 However, modem experience demonstrates that these fears have
not materialized.
Accreditation Slow To Change with the Times?, Hosp. & Health Networks, June 5, 1995, at 54,
available in Westlaw, HHNTWK Database, 1995 WL 8429316.
130. NCQA is the leading organization that accredits HMOs. NCQA had accredited 156 HMOs
nationwide in 1994 and expects to have reviewed half of the nation's 600 or so HMOs by the end of
1995. Id.
131. Id.
132. See Pedroza v. Bryant, 101 Wash. 2d 226,233, 677 P.2d 166, 171 (1984).
133. A 1994 survey conducted by the Managed Health Care Association, an employer trade group
that promotes managed care, found that 24% of the member companies required accreditation, and
63% of the remaining companies planned to require accreditation in the next one to three years. See
Sandrick, supra note 129.
134. See State v. Boren, 36 Wash 2d. 522, 531, 219 P.2d 566, 571, appeal dismissed per curiam,
340 U.S. 881 (1950); State ex rel. Standard Optical Co. v. Superior Court, 17 Wash. 2d. 323, 332,
135 P.2d 839, 843 (1943).
135. See Boren, 36 Wash 2d. at 531,219 P.2d at 571; Standard Optical, 17 Wash. 2d. at 332, 135
P.2d at 843.
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Corporate involvement in the health care market has increased despite
corporate practice bans. Corporate entities such as HMOs and PPOs have
experienced dramatic growth. 136 Yet, evidence of reduced quality of care
resulting from alleged commercial exploitation and divided physician
loyalties has not emerged. In fact, a recent study examining the quality of
care in a managed care setting found no reduction in quality.
37
Furthermore, as previously noted, extensive regulations ensure that
patients receive adequate care. 3 Processes such as quality assurance and
utilization review examine physician practice procedures and patient
relationships, and intrude on those relationships if necessary. 139 In
addition, no evidence supports the assertion that physicians previously
devoted to patient care will suddenly lose their focus on patient advocacy
once a corporation enters the relationship. All physicians are bound by
the Hippocratic oath 4 ' and professional ethics standards, regardless of
corporate affiliation. Moreover, the established law in all states holds all
physicians to the same standard in malpractice cases.' 4'
Finally, the divided loyalty argument did not prevent the Washington
Legislature from enacting the Professional Service Corporations Act.'42
In terms of profit-making objectives, there is little difference between a
doctor employed by a group of physicians and a doctor employed by a
corporation controlled by non-physicians. Each entity has the same
potential to divide physician loyalty between the corporation and patient.
136. See supra notes 106-08 and accompanying text.
137. See Sheldon Greenfield et al., Outcomes of Patients with Hypertension and Non-Insulin-
Dependent Diabetes Mellitus Treated by Different Systems and Specialties: Results From the
Medical Outcomes Study, 274 JAMA 1436 (1995).
138. See supra text accompanying notes 125-3 1.
139. For example, Wash. Rev. Code section 70A1.200 provides that a physician may lose certain
clinical privileges, such as operating privileges, if he or she refuses to alter unsound practice
procedures. See Wash. Rev. Code § 70.41.200(l)(b) (1994).
140. All physicians taking the oath swear that "the regime I adopt shall be for the benefit of my
patients according to my ability and judgment and not for their hurt or for any wrong." The oath does
not distinguish corporate physicians from other physicians. See Kovner, supra note 102, at 477.
141. The Washington Legislature has codified the proof necessary to show that an injury was
caused by failure to follow the accepted standard of care. The statute applies to all physicians and
states that a "health care provider [who] failed to exercise that degree of care . . . expected of a
reasonably prudent health care provider" may be found negligent. Wash. Rev. Code § 7.70.040
(1994) (emphasis added).
142. See supra notes 56-58 and accompanying text.
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3. Misplaced Concern with Lay Control of Physicians
Washington courts in the first half of this century also voiced concern
about lay control of physicians.'43 The corporate practice of medicine
doctrine evolved to protect physician autonomy and to ensure that only
those with the necessary knowledge and training were exercising medical
judgment regarding diagnosis and treatment of disease.'" There is a
crucial difference, however, between corporate involvement in the
business aspects of health care and the corporate practice of medicine.
In several states, courts distinguish between the management functions
of the corporation and the actual furnishing of medical services by
professionals. For example, in Daw's Critical Care Registry, Inc. v.
Department of Labor,45 a Connecticut court differentiated between
providing nurses and caring for patients.'46 The defendant corporation in
Daw's had brokered nursing services to medical facilities. The court held
that the "business of providing health care personnel- does not translate
into the business of caring for patients."' 47 The court specifically noted
that the corporation had no control over how the nurses provided their
services.'48 Similarly, in Women's Medical Center v. Finley, 49 a New
Jersey appellate court distinguished nonprofessional business matters,
such as paying office expenses and maintaining business records, from
professional medical practices. 5° The court recognized that all health
care providers or entities must perform business, administrative, and
management chores. As long as the manner of their performance "does
not impinge upon professional control by the physicians of the medical
practice," the court found that the business management of the practice
does not affect the delivery of health care services."
In each of the Washington cases, however, the court rejected the
distinction between the professional aspects of medicine and its business
143. State v. Boren, 36 Wash. 2d 522, 524-26, 219 P.2d 566, 567-68, appeal dismissed per
curiam, 340 U.S. 881 (1950); State ex rel. Standard Optical Co. v. Superior Court, 17 Wash. 2d 323,
328, 135 P.2d 839, 841 (1943).
144. See supra text accompanying notes 12-15.
145. 622 A.2d 622 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1992), aff'd, 622 A.2d 518 (Conn. 1993).
146. Id. at 636.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. 469 A.2d 65 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1983), cert. denied, 475 A.2d 578 (N.J. 1984).
150. Id. at 73.
151. Id.
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functions. 52 The unwillingness of the Washington Supreme Court to
recognize this distinction has led to the unnecessary and confused
expansion of the doctrine. The development of the corporate practice
prohibition from the licensing statutes 53 indicates that the critical
function of the doctrine is to ensure physician autonomy in medical
decisions. 54 Physician contracting and employment relationships are not
medical decisions and accordingly should not be governed by the
doctrine.
The Washington Legislature has implicitly distinguished the actual
practice of medicine from business activities. By definition, practicing
medicine includes such activities as diagnosing, advising, prescribing,
curing, or administering drugs.'55 This definition does not encompass
business activities. Furthermore, the Legislature defines health care
services as "medical, surgical . . . hospital and other therapeutic
services, '  but not as business or management functions. Because
Washington's corporate practice of medicine doctrine fails to recognize
this very crucial distinction, the concern over lay control of physicians
by corporate actors is largely misplaced.
C. Legislative Acceptance of and Acquiescence in Corporate
Involvement in Health Care
In addition to the historical changes that have weakened the doctrine's
underlying justifications, the doctrine does not reflect the current state
and federal legislative recognition of corporate participation in medicine.
The Washington Legislature has implicitly accepted and acquiesced in
corporate involvement in health care. Further, both state and federal law
explicitly sanction physician employment.
1. Professional Service Corporations Act
In 1983, the Legislature amended the Professional Service
Corporations Act to permit HMOs to employ physicians to practice
152. Morelli v. Ehsan, 110 Wash. 2d 555, 756 P.2d 129 (1988); State v. Boren, 36 Wash. 2d 522,
219 P.2d 566, appeal dismissed per curiam, 340 U.S. 881 (1950); State ex rel. Standard Optical Co.
v. Superior Court, 17 Wash. 2d 323, 135 P.2d 839 (1943).
153. See supra notes 12-15 and accompanying text.
154. See Wiorek, supra note 30, at 467.
155. Wash. Rev. Code § 18.71.011 (1994).
156. Wash. Rev. Code § 48.44.010 (1994).
424
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medicine.'57 By creating the HMO exception, the Legislature disregarded
the concerns underlying the corporate practice of medicine doctrine.
The HMO structure incorporates many of the characteristics that the
corporate practice of medicine doctrine was designed to protect against.
For example, HMOs use a fixed-budget structure, which creates
management incentives to pressure physicians not to order expensive
tests of marginal diagnostic value.'58 Furthermore, an HMO's use of
utilization review programs has the potential to impose corporate control
over treatment decisions. Finally, the HMO structure creates an inherent
risk of physician loyalty to the corporation at the expense of the
patient.59
2. The Plain Language of Statutory Provisions Refutes the Validity of
the Corporate Practice of Medicine Doctrine
Several statutory provisions undermine the corporate practice of
medicine doctrine. First, the Medical Malpractice Prevention Act of
1986160 explicitly contemplates hospital employment of physicians. The
act provides that before "hiring a physician, a hospital or facility...
shall request from the physician" certain detailed information relevant to
the credentialing of the individual.' 6 ' Second, section 4.24.240 of the
Revised Code of Washington grants immunity from civil damage actions
arising out of peer review activities. The statute specifically covers
entities that employ physicians or surgeons. 162 A plain reading of both
statutes demonstrates the legislative recognition of physician-hospital
employment relationships.
In addition, the language of both sections 18.71.011 and 18.71.021 of
the Revised Code of Washington casts doubt on the validity of the
corporate practice of medicine doctrine. Under section 18.71.011, "a
person is practicing medicine" if he engages in any of the activities listed
in the statute.'63 The statute does not refer to a corporate entity practicing
medicine. Likewise, Washington law requires that a person obtain a
157. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
158. See Kovner, supra note 102, at 255-56.
159. See Dowell, supra note 16.
160. Wash. Rev. Code § 70.41.230 (1994).
161. Wash. Rev. Code § 70.41.230(1) (1994) (emphasis added).
162. Wash. Rev. Code § 4.24.240(1)(c) (Supp. 1995).
163. Wash. Rev. Code § 18.71.011 (1994) (emphasis added).
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license before practicing medicine,"6 and does not mention a corporate
entity. It is difficult, therefore, to understand how a corporation can be
engaged in the practice of medicine, when by statutory definition, only
individuals practice medicine. 6  The Nebraska Supreme Court, which
never adopted the corporate practice of medicine doctrine, gave this same
explanation in State Electro-Medical Institute v. State. 66 The court held
that the medical licensure statutes did not apply to corporations; it ruled
that a corporation is incapable of practicing medicine because an
impersonal entity cannot diagnose or treat a disease.'67
Finally, the plain language of several provisions cf federal law
explicitly recognizes physician employment by health care entities. Both
the federal fraud and abuse provisions and the Stark I Amendment
specifically recognize physician employment. 68 Congress, by enacting
these provisions, did not share the corporate practice of medicine
concerns of the Washington courts.
The fraud and abuse provisions, also known as the anti-kickback
statutes, prohibit the receipt or payment of remuneration in exchange for
referring a patient for services paid for by the Medicare program.'
69
Whoever knowingly and willfully induces such referral; is subject to
criminal prosecution and a substantial fine. 70 Rules issued by the Officer
of Inspector General create "safe harbors" that immunize various
payment practices and business arrangements from prosecution under the
anti-kickback provisions.' An employment relationship is a "safe
harbor" under the fraud and abuse statute.
172
The Stark I Amendment bans certain physician self-:referral in the
Medicare program. The enactment prohibits a physician from referring
Medicare patients to an entity for particular designated health services if
164. Wash. Rev. Code § 18.71.021 (Supp. 1995).
165. See supra note 15; see also State ex rel. Standard Optical Co. v. Superior Court, 17 Wash. 2d
323, 328, 135 P.2d 839, 841 (1943) (stating that although "'a corporation is in some sense a
person ... yet, as regards the learned professions which can only be practiced by persons who have
received a license . . . it is recognized that a corporation cannot be licensed to practice such a
profession"') (quoting 13 Am. Jur. Corporations , 837).
166. 103 N.W. 1078 (Neb. 1905).
167. Id. at 1079.
168. See 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b (1994); 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn(e)(2) (1994).
169. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b.
170. A person violating the statute is guilty of a felony and upon conviction shall be fined not
more than $25,000, or imprisoned for not more than five years, or both. 42 U.S.C § 1320a-7b.
171. 42 C.F.R. § 1001.952 (1995).
172. 42 C.F.R. § 1001.952(i) (1995).
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the physician has a financial relationship with that entity. 73 However,
federal law provides a specific exception to this general prohibition when
the physician has a bona fide employment relationship with a hospital. 74
So long as the physician is employed for identifiable services and the
amount paid to the physician is consistent with the fair market value of
the services, the payments do not run afoul of the Stark I Amendment.
The statute further provides that hospitals may pay employed physicians
a productivity bonus without violating the law.'75
The fraud and abuse provisions and the Stark I Amendment apply to
all Washington providers receiving federal Medicare funds.'76 Federal
Medicare laws are critical to Washington health care consumers and
providers. Receipt of Medicare funds is necessary to ensure patient
access to health care. Further, Medicare reimbursement comprises a large
portion of provider revenue.'77 Thus, public policy concerns demand that
Washington law avoid conflict with federal Medicare law.
D. The Illegality Defense
Finally, Washington's corporate practice of medicine doctrine should
be reconsidered because it is currently employed far beyond its original
intended scope. The doctrine was established to protect patients and
safeguard physician autonomy over medical decisions.' In Standard
Optical79 and Boren,"8° the state brought actions against corporations to
protect the public. The court applied the doctrine in these early cases to
achieve the doctrine's fundamental goals. More recently, however,
protecting patients and safeguarding physician autonomy was not the
central issue of a judicial decision involving the doctrine. In Morelli, a
party used the doctrine to defend against an otherwise legal obligation. 8'
The illegality defense does not effectuate the intended aims of the
173. 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn(a) (1994).
174. 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn(e)(2).
175. 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn(e)(2).
176. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b; 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn(a).
177. Medicare is the single largest purchaser of physicians' services in the United States.
Payments from the Medicare program account for over 25% of physicians' gross revenues. See
Physician Payment Review Commission, supra note 4, at 77.
178. See supra text accompanying notes 14-20.
179. State ex rel. Standard Optical Co. v. Superior Court, 17 Wash. 2d 323, 135 P.2d 839 (1943).
180. State v. Boren, 36 Wash. 2d 522, 219 P.2d 566, appeal dismissed per curiam, 340 U.S. 881
(1950).
181. Morelli v. Ehsan, 110 Wash. 2d 555,756 P.2d 129 (1988).
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doctrine, but rather, operates to interfere with contractual relationships.
Therefore, the doctrine should be narrowed to avoid further use of this
practice and instead should focus on the goals underlying, the doctrine's
development.
IV. NARROWING THE SCOPE OF THE CORPORATE PRACTICE
OF MEDICINE DOCTRINE
Although the corporate practice of medicine doctrine is outdated, the
doctrine should not be abolished. Its remaining justification is the
prohibition of lay control over physician autonomy in medical decisions.
The doctrine should serve a single critical function in the modem health
care environment-that of protector of physician sovereignty in health
care decisions. Narrowed in this manner, the doctrine can benefit both
physicians and patients without infringing on modem developments that
have made corporate involvement in the delivery of health care services a
vital necessity.
A recent South Dakota statute provides a useful modes by which the
Washington Legislature might amend chapter 18.71 of the Revised Code
of Washington to appropriately narrow the corporate practice of
medicine doctrine. Adopted in 1993, the South Dakota statute provides,
in part:
It is the public policy of this state that a corporation may not
practice medicine or osteopathy. A corporation is not engaged in
the practice of medicine or osteopathy and is not in -violation of
[this section] by entering into an employment agreement with a
physician licensed pursuant to this chapter if the agreement or the
relationship it creates does not . . . [i]n any manner, directly or
indirectly, supplant, diminish or regulate the physician's
independent judgment concerning the practice of med:lcine or the
diagnosis and treatment of any patient.'82
An amendment based on the South Dakota provision would repair
several weaknesses in Washington law. First, the statute removes any
doubt concerning the extent of the corporate prohibition. It makes clear
that the practice of medicine by any corporation is prohibited whether the
entity is a hospital, nursing home, managed care entity, or any other
health delivery organization. Thus, South Dakota health care providers
and their attorneys know which organizations are included in the
182. S.D. Codified Laws Ann. § 36-4-8.1 (Supp. 1995).
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prohibition.'83 Washington providers, in contrast, have little guidance as
to the extent of the Washington prohibition. Washington case law has
spoken only to dentistry, optometry, and a medical partnership. The case
law never has addressed physician employment. Clarifying the extent of
the corporate prohibition promotes certainty, and would facilitate
planning, by helping Washington providers determine which
arrangements are lawful.
Second, the South Dakota statute clearly authorizes the employment
of licensed physicians while protecting physician autonomy in medical
decisions. By allowing physician employment, the law recognizes the
critical distinction between business activities and the actual practice of
medicine. Moreover, it effectuates the last remaining justification for the
corporate practice of medicine doctrine: preventing lay control of
physicians' medical decisions. Conversely, the Washington doctrine fails
to distinguish between business and medical activities. No Washington
statute specifically prohibits lay control of physician judgment.
Finally, the South Dakota statute curtails the use of the illegality
defense. The corporate practice of medicine doctrine never was intended
to interfere in contractual relationships or to be utilized to harass
competitors. Unfortunately, the doctrine is currently employed in this
manner. The South Dakota statute limits corporate practice of medicine
as an illegality defense by clearly defining what constitutes a violation'84
and by excluding physician employment from the definition. Thus,
providers are certain about which relationships are lawful and need not
worry that an unclear law will be used later to interfere in a contractual
relationship.
Accordingly, the Washington Legislature should adopt an amendment
to chapter 18.71 of the Revised Code of Washington that is similar to
section 34-4-8.1 of the South Dakota statute. Such legislation would
narrow the scope of the doctrine while retaining sufficient safeguards to
protect physician autonomy and prevent deterioration of patient care.
183. All corporations, regardless of the specific type of the organization, are prohibited from
practicing medicine. S.D. Codified Laws Ann. § 36-4-8.1 (stating that "a corporation may not
practice medicine").
184. See S.D. Codified Laws Ann. § 36-4-8 (stating that the unlicensed practice of medicine is
misdemeanor); S.D. Codified Laws Ann. § 36-4-8.1 (prohibiting a corporation from practicing
medicine) S.D. Codified Laws Ann. § 36-4-9 (defining the practice of medicine).
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IV. CONCLUSION
The corporate practice of medicine doctrine as it now operates in
Washington is antiquated and should be reconsidered. The doctrine arose
in an era much different from the health care environment of today.
Although the justifications for the doctrine were once valid, they are
presently addressed by other measures and hence, have lost their
legitimacy in the new health care market. Modem regulations are
available to protect the patient from the "quackery" that the corporate
prohibition once sought to avoid. In addition, use of the doctrine in an
illegality defense illustrates that the doctrine's current use exceeds its
original purpose.
Although the Washington Legislature has implicitly accepted
corporate involvement in medicine, it should enact legislation to
explicitly clarify and narrow the reach of the corporate practice of
medicine doctrine. This would clarify the extent of the prohibition,
explicitly authorize physician employment, and curtail the use of the
illegality defense. Amending Washington law in accordance with the
South Dakota statute would remove any lingering doubts regarding the
scope and applicability of the corporate practice of medicine doctrine in
Washington.
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